We study attorney fee clauses in a data set of 2,350 contracts contained as exhibits in Form 8-K filings by reporting corporations. Because 8-K filings are required only for material events, these contracts likely are negotiated by sophisticated parties and, therefore, provide evidence of efficient ex ante solutions to contracting problems. The American Rule for compensating attorneys requires each party to pay its own attorney, win or lose; the English Rule (applicable rule in most of the world) requires the losing party to pay the winner's reasonable fees. Adoption of the English Rule or other loser-pays arrangements has frequently been proposed as a solution to perceived U.S. litigation problems. But the vast theoretical modeling literature on fees has reached no consensus. Empirical reality should help assess the models and provide new insights. Because contracting parties can opt out of the American Rule and into a loser-pays rule at low cost, we expect such opt-outs to occur frequently if the English Rule more efficiently compensates counsel. Our data show, however, that the American Rule is preferred about as often as the English Rule (or similar loser-pays rules). Choosing the American Rule is associated with the following contractual features: specific kinds of contracts, the presence of a non-U.S. party, the absence of arbitration clauses and jury trial waivers, selection of New York law in contracts other than underwriting contracts, and a likely long-term relation between the parties. It is inversely associated with an increasing degree of contract standardization. Sophisticated parties thus often perceive the American Rule to be value-enhancing compared to loser-pays systems but contracting parties that opt out of U.S. courts through arbitration clauses, or eliminate jury trials through jury waiver clauses tend to reject the American Rule. The findings suggest that theoretical models should resist the assumption that a single attorney fee rule is most efficient in all contexts and that models should strive to account for real-world factors associated with fee clauses.
I. Introduction
under a contract which specifies that that party is to receive fees from its adversary if it prevails.
5 These (and other) rules on attorney compensation have stimulated considerable discussion in policy circles --a dialogue characterized more by the intensity of the views expressed than by convincing arguments advanced on behalf of any particular arrangement. Many researchers have also tackled questions of attorney compensation from a theoretical perspective. But despite decades of investigation, no consensus has emerged. The question remains: which rule specifies the efficient arrangement for compensating counsel?
This paper sheds new light on this debate. The paper is premised on the idea that at the time of entering into a contract, sophisticated parties have incentives to adopt terms that maximize joint value. Unless externalities are present, maximizing the value of the parties will also maximize social welfare. Thus, if such parties are well-informed and other barriers to contracting are not present, we can expect that the decisions actually made will tend to reflect the efficient ex ante solution to contracting problems. This principle holds true for contractual provisions for dispute resolution. 6 At the time of contracting, when the parties do not know what type of dispute may arise during performance and cannot anticipate whether they will be plaintiffs or defendants, their mutual incentive is to adopt efficient dispute-resolution terms. Examining actual decisions made by sophisticated parties can therefore be a means for investigating 5 N.Y. Real Property Law § 234 (McKinney) (requiring landlord to pay tenant's attorney fees if lease of residential property requires tenant to pay landlord's attorney fees). 6 See, e.g., Keith Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209 (2000) (if option to litigate reduces the joint wealth of contracting parties, market forces will push them in the direction of alternative forms of dispute resolution); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 1, 5 (1995) ("parties would tend to adopt ADR if it would lead to mutual advantages").
questions about dispute resolution that have heretofore been answered only theoretically.
In prior work we have examined a variety of dispute resolution provisions in commercial contracts: choice of law and choice of forum clauses, 7 jury trial waivers, 8 and arbitration agreements.
9
The present paper uses the same methodology to examine contractual agreements for compensating counsel. Contracting parties have nearly complete freedom to specify whatever terms they like in this area. If they do nothing, the background American Rule will apply. But they can at low cost insert provisions that contract around the American Rule and substitute the English Rule or some other fee-shifting arrangement. 10 Because fee provisions can affect the dynamics of litigation, we assume that the parties or their attorneys are likely to some thought to this matter. The clauses actually adopted ought to ' Contracts, 56 DePaul Law Review 335 (2007) . 10 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1021 ("[e] xcept as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . ."); Student Loan Marketing Association v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629 (S.D.Cal. 1998) (applying California law). The proposition that courts will enforce contractual loser-pays arrangements may be qualified by the possibility that such an agreement would not be respected if deemed to be the result of inequality of bargaining power. In California, for example, contracts requiring payment of fees to the prevailing party will be enforced, but ones that simply stipulate that one party shall pay the other's fees, without regard to outcome, are not. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a) ("[i] n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.") Even if they enforce fee-shifting agreements, moreover, courts may exercise equitable discretion to ensure that the fees are reasonable in amount. See Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Ambrosano, 89 A.D.2d 730, 731, 453 N.Y.S. 2d 857, 858 (1982) (applying New York law). For discussion of possibilities of opting into or out of fee rules by agreement mid-litigation, see John J. Donohue, Opting for the British Rule; or, If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093 Rev. (1991 .
provide evidence on the theoretical and policy debate over the optimal methodology for compensating counsel.
We examine attorney fee clauses in a sample of 2,350 contracts filed with the Securities Exchange Commission in 2002 by public firms,. Many of these contracts contained explicit provisions on attorney compensation, indicating that the issue was salient to the contracting parties. About two-fifths of the contracts opted for the English Rule, a pattern indicating that a substantial percentage of the contracting parties believed this to be an efficient approach. However, if the English Rule were better than the American Rule in all circumstances, we would expect to see a nearly uniform pattern of opting in to that regime. This was not the case. About two-fifths of the contracts either did nothing or specified the American Rule -in either case leaving intact the background rule that each party pays its own attorney, win or lose. Again the pattern shows substantial popularity for the American Rule but no consensus. The remaining contracts -about one-fifth of the total -opted out of the American Rule but did not opt in to the English Rule, electing instead to adopt some modified form of loser-pays arrangement.
These results bear on the theoretical question mentioned above and provide a noteworthy instance of the relation between theoretical and empirical research. The quest for a single, most efficient fee-shifting regime may be futile in light of the evidence suggested by sophisticated parties' practices. An earlier empirical look at actual contracting practice might have limited the massive volume of contradictory models about the optimal attorney fee rule and contributed to more nuanced models that better reflect reality.
This paper is structured as follows. Part II describes the data; Part III discusses the literature on attorney fee rules and identifies the hypotheses we test; Part IV presents the results; Part V discusses the results; and Part VI concludes.
II. The Data
The data consist of twelve types of material contracts contained as exhibits to We coded the contracts for a variety of contract terms, including terms related to the settlement of disputes that might arise under the contract, as well as information on the nature and location of the contracting parties. We also coded the type of contract, as shown in Table 1 . For eleven contract categories, six months of contracts, covering the period January 1 to June 30, 2002, were studied. For merger contracts, the study covered a seven-month period from January 1 to July 31, 2002. The slightly expanded period for merger contracts draws on our earlier work on choice-of-law and choice of forum in merger contracts.
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Most of the contract types are self-explanatory. "Pooling and servicing" contracts are used in mortgage pass-through and other asset-backed securities arrangements; they represent agreements under which an owner transfers receivables to a Rev. 1975 Rev. (2006 . trustee which holds title to and collects the income from the assets and passes the funds through to investors. 12 Trust agreements establish these trusts and define certain of their powers and responsibilities. 13 We excluded contracts that could not be categorized into one of the twelve categories in Table 1 . Also relevant, in a complete welfare analysis, is the impact of different fee regimes on the evolution and form of the law itself. Prichard argues that the English Rule enhances predictability of legal rules relative to the American Rule, and suggests that predictability is generally a desirable feature of legal systems. 37 Hylton examines the impact of a one-way offer of judgment rule on the development of substantive law, and concludes that a one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule is superior to either the English or the American Rules as a device for achieving predictability. 38 On the other hand, the English Rule or one-way fee-shifting rules may decrease rather than increase predictability if they discourage the generation of precedents; and predictability is not the only criterion by which one judges the efficacy of a litigation system.
Finally, several studies analyze the impact of offer-of-judgment rules. Analyses of one-way offers of judgment provisions (that benefit only defendants and not plaintiffs) suggest that they redistribute wealth from plaintiffs to defendants and shrink the settlement range, 39 but fail to reach definite conclusions about the impact of such rules on settlement rates. Overall, the theoretical literature is indeterminate as to the practical effects and social utility of attorney fee regimes. Avery Katz summarizes the situation as follows:
[T]he current state of economic knowledge does not enable us reliably to predict whether a move to fuller indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of litigation, let alone whether it would better align those costs with any social benefits they might generate. The reason for this agnostic conclusion is straightforward. Legal costs influence all aspects of the litigation process, from the decision to file suit to the choice between settlement and trial to the question whether to take precautions against a dispute in the first place . . . . The combination of all these external effects is too complicated to be remedied by a simple rule of "loser pays." Instead, indemnity of legal fees remedies some externalities while failing to address and even exacerbating others. 
Evidence
If Several empirical studies have examined one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rules.
Hylton found that such rules would minimize litigation and maximize underlying legal compliance as compared with either the American or the English Rules. 49 Eisenberg and
Schwab found that a one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule increased trials and reduced plaintiffs' success rates at trial, but also found little evidence that a one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule increased the number of lawsuits filed.
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Other empirical studies have analyzed offer-of-judgment regimes. Inglis et al, using an experimental approach, concluded that a symmetrical offer-of-judgment rule covering costs of litigation only had no effect on settlement rates as compared with an environment lacking any cost-shifting rule, but the expansion of an offer-of-judgment rule to include attorney fees as well as costs would increase settlement rates.
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Overall, perhaps the most that can be said is that academic research have generated few clear-cut results other than the (obvious) conclusion that the English Rule is relatively more risky than the American Rule, and the (somewhat less obvious)
proposition that the English Rule will stimulate greater expenditures on litigation.
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The lack of firm results to date suggests the value of new approaches to the issue.
This paper adopts such an approach by examining what choices sophisticated parties actually make with respect to the allocation of legal fees in disputes over contracts.
B. Hypotheses
Our study, the first of its type in the literature, permits the formulation and testing of hypotheses regarding the propensity of the contracting parties to select one rule over another -information which, as discussed above, is evidence about the ex ante efficient contractual solution.
First, and most obviously, we can hypothesize about the rule that the parties select. Lacking consensus in the empirical literature as to the welfare effects of the various rules, we test the proposition that the contracts in our data set will reflect the view that some form of loser-pays system is preferable to the traditional American Rule on fees. 56 Although we are largely agnostic about the preferred rule, the contracts in our sample might be expected to opt out of the American Rule less than some other classes of contracts. To the extent concern about the American Rule is associated with fear of its promotion of frivolous litigation, we do not expect that fear to be prominent with respect to the contracts in our sample. Material contracts between sophisticated actors likely are not perceived as a prime source of frivolous litigation. If that is correct, one can regard contracts' rejection of the American Rule as evidence of concerns about the American Rule other than concerns about frivolous litigation.
Hypothesis: Most of the contracts in the data set will opt out of the American
Rule.
We can also construct subsidiary hypotheses testing in more detail the decision to select a particular fee allocation rule. Given that the American Rule is an outlier on the world scene, and that most Western countries administer some form of a loser-pays system, we may hypothesize that foreign counterparties in international contracts will feel 56 A survey of business attorneys in Alaska, which does administer a loser-pays rule, found overwhelming support for retaining the rule rather than reverting to the American Rule. Attorney fees provisions can be included in contracts that specify that the resolution of disputes shall be by arbitration rather than litigation. The rules of some associations provide arbitrators with discretion to award fees, but unless the parties so specify, the arbitrator (if the arbitration is domestic) is unlikely to deviate from the American Rule. 58 Thus, some commentators encourage attorneys drafting arbitration agreements to consider include a specific fee-shifting provision. 59 The English Rule may be difficult to administer in arbitration, however, because it may be difficult to identify the prevailing party. Moreover, the broad discretion given to arbitrators may essentially vitiate the effect of the English Rule if it is selected because the arbitrator can engage in non-transparent tradeoffs between the award on the merits and the award of fees.
Accordingly, we may hypothesize that the parties may perceive little benefit in opting out of the American Rule in the case of arbitrations. 57 Evidence exists that attitudes towards dispute resolution provisions can noticeably vary between the U.S. and other countries. A law firm survey shows large differences between U.S. and U.K. counsel with respect to use of arbitration. Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Fulbright's 6 th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report 21-24 (2009) (51% of U.K. companies surveyed preferred arbitration for domestic disputes compared to 32% of U.S. companies; and a higher fraction of U.K. companies had commenced international arbitrations), available at: http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/26EBEE9A1CED6C14852576 740055DE8F/$File/Fulbright's%206th%20Annual%20Litigation%20Trends%20Survey%20Report.pdf?Op enElement, accessed 11/1/2010. Some authority exists to the effect that if the chosen law is one that would authorize fee-shifting, the court may award fees according to the foreign law's rules. See 
Hypothesis: Loser-pays clauses will be less commonly observed in contracts that
provide for mandatory arbitration.
The degree to which a contract is relational may be associated with the type of attorney fee clause used. In "one-off" arrangements -for example, the sale of an assetthe parties anticipate only a very brief relationship, extending (absent problems with the sale) only up to the closing of the transaction. In other contracts -employment contracts being paradigmatic -the parties anticipate a substantial period of performance during which they will have to work together. In long-term, relational arrangements, the parties may wish to avoid the English Rule which requires that one party be deemed to be in the right and the other deemed in the wrong for purposes of assessing fees, and which may enhance the possibility of strained relations by requiring one party to pay the other's fees.
Hypothesis: Loser-pays rules will be less frequently observed in relational contracts than in one-off contracts.
Our prior studies identified a significant association between standardization of contract terms and other dispute-resolution decisions, such as the decision to submit disputes to mandatory arbitration or to waiver jury trial rights. 60 It is therefore worth exploring whether standardization has a similar effect in the area of attorney compensation clauses. Contract standardization itself need not point towards a particular attorney compensation rule but may have implications for the distribution of fee clauses across the various rules. We expect less standardized material contracts to have been negotiated with some care. Since more individual attention was presumably given per contract, the distribution of attorney fee clauses in such contracts might be more diffuse than the distribution in more standardized contracts. In addition, the fact of high standardization may reflect a prior history of detailed negotiations concerning repeat-pattern transactions.
If the historical negotiated terms were the product of substantial bargaining, more highly standardized classes of contracts might have been expected to settle on what was perceived to be an optimal fee clause. This would support less variability in the distribution of fee clauses.
Aside from these distributional forecasts, standardized contracts may simply reflect a preference for a set of default rules. Since the default rule for fees in the U.S. is the American Rule, one might expect highly standardized contracts to prefer, perhaps by default, the American Rule. (2) The distribution of fee clauses will be more variable in less standardized contracts.
Loser-pays rules increase the risk of litigation. It is possible, therefore, that parties may shy away from loser-pays rules when the litigation is inherently risky. This suggests a potential interaction between loser-pays rules and jury trial waivers: because juries are thought to increase the risks of litigation, it is interesting to test whether the presence of a jury reduces the likelihood that a loser-pays provision will be adopted, and conversely, whether the presence of a jury trial waiver increases the likelihood that a loser-pays rule will be adopted.
Hypothesis: Loser-pays rules will be more frequently observed in the presence of jury trial waivers.
Finally, we explore the possibility that the adoption of loser-pays reflects industry-specific patterns.
Hypothesis: Loser-pays rules will be more frequent in some industries than others.
We forego examining the relation between fee clauses and attorney locale because the available information about attorney locale suggests that no locale accounts for more than 11% of the contracts. 64 We do, however, report results based on the governing law specified in contracts. As we previously reported, New York dominates as the governing choice of law in the contracts studied here. 65 New York-specific effects, if they exist, should be accounted for in assessing the pattern of fee clauses specified. 
IV. Empirical Results
For purposes of coding attorney fee clauses, we constructed a taxonomy of fee provisions. We construed a contract as containing no fee-shifting (the American Rule)
when the contract did not mention fees or when it expressly invoked the standard American Rule. We coded a contract as containing the English Rule if the contract specified that the losing party would pay attorney fees. We distinguished between
English Rule provisions by a separate code for English Rule provisions that allowed for discretion (these allow the court, in its discretion, to award fees to the prevailing party).
Three additional codes were used. Several contracts specified that one party only was the beneficiary of an attorney fee-shifting clause in the event it prevailed in litigation. We separately coded contracts that specified that the reporting party (the party filing the report with the SEC) benefitted from the clause and contracts that specified that the nonreporting party benefitted from the clause. A last category of contracts involved fee clauses specifying that both parties may benefit from fee clauses under different circumstances.
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This Part first presents results showing the relation between individual factors and our hypotheses. It then presents regression results that report models of contracts specifying the American Rule as a function of multiple factors.
(2009). We do not assess the relation between choice of forum and attorney fee clauses because so many of the contracts in our sample did not specify a forum, id. at 1503-04, and because the pattern of choice of forum for those contracts specifying a forum is largely explained by choice of law. Id. at 1504. 66 For example, the contract may provide that the seller must pay the buyer's attorney fees if the seller is found to have made a misrepresentation or false warranty, and the buyer must pay the seller's fees if the buyer is held to have wrongfully failed to deliver the purchase price at the closing. About the only clear result that emerges from Table 2 is that no fee clause dominates. The hypothesis that sophisticated parties will flee the American Rule is supported in the sense that most contracts contain clauses specifying either the English Rule or a variant of pro-one-party shifting. But no uniform endorsement of opting out of the American Rule or into the English Rule appears. The American Rule is as prominent as any other fee clause provision.
A. Bivariate Results
A remaining question is whether characteristics of contracts or parties help explain this basic observed pattern of fee clauses. opt mostly for the non-reporting company, presumably the borrower, paying the fees of the lender. When those agreements do not contain such a clause, they tend to employ the American Rule. For six of the seven other contract types, the American and English Rules appear at roughly similar rates, with the spread between them not exceeding 15%.
Pooling and servicing contracts have the largest rate of using other fee clauses. We hypothesized that international contracts would favor loser pays fee-shifting and The American Rule thus was more prominent in international contracts than in domestic contracts, though the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.398). The absence of noticeable difference between domestic and international contracts persists if one focuses on comparable contracts by comparing the same contract type across the two panels. Asset sale contracts, merger agreements, and securities purchase contracts had the greatest numbers of international deals, yet no striking difference emerged in the rate at which they specified the American or English Rules.
We hypothesized little difference in type of fee clauses based on whether parties agreed to ex ante arbitration. Each of the contract types with a reasonably large number of agreements containing arbitration clauses---asset sale, employment, mergers, and securities purchase---shows a lower rate of use of the American Rule compared to the rule's use for same contract type that does not contain an arbitration clause. 67 Coding contracts' relational status can be imprecise. A settlement, for example, may be the termination of a short-term or long-term relation or may promote a continued relation. We crudely coded for relational status based on contract categories, with the following contract categories as more likely to be relational: credit commitments, employment, licensing, pooling and service agreements, and security agreements; and the following categories as less likely to be relational: asset sales, bond indentures, mergers, securities purchase agreements, settlements, and underwritings. We omitted trust agreements from the sample for purposes of the analysis of relational contracts because relational status for these contracts is insufficiently clear. Table 7 shows no strong preference for the American or English Rule by degree of standardization. The percent of contracts choosing one or the other rules does not vary by as much as 6.5% for any of the three standardization levels. Some tendency exists, however for the most highly standardized contract types to have a more variable distribution of the fee rules employed. About 86% of the least standardized (the "Low" rows in Table 7 ) contracts employ the American or English Rule while only 65% of the most standardized ("High" rows) contracts employ either of these rules. The difference diminishes if one includes as employing the English Rule the 9.9% of highly standardized contracts that employ the English Rule with discretion. Including the discretionary clauses makes the use of the English Rule similar in low and high standardization classes of contracts. But that qualification does not affect the diminished role of the American Rule in highly standardized contracts. If one divides fee rules into the American Rule and all others, the difference in the use of the American Rule across standardization levels is highly statistically significant (p<0.001). So the pattern of clauses suggests a diminished role for the American Rule in the most highly standardized contracts. We hypothesized that the English Rule would be more prominent in contracts that waived jury trials. Table 8 Both the English Rule and the American Rule were used less frequently in contracts that waived jury trial than in contracts that did not. Overall, 40.1% of contracts that did not waive jury trial specified the American Rule and 37.2% of non-waiver contracts specified the English Rule. The rates exceed the rates of contracts specifying these rules in contracts that waived jury trials, 36.0% and 27.1% respectively. Parties and attorneys who have gone to the trouble to opt out of jury trial are more likely to specify an attorney fee rule other than the two dominant rules.
For contract types with at least 20 observations under both jury clause conditions, results varied. Asset sale purchase contracts waiving jury trial preferred the English Rule over the American Rule. Credit commitments waiver contracts tended to flee the American Rule in favor of the non-reporting company paying fees. Merger agreements did not noticeably vary by waiver clause but did not tend towards using the English Rule.
Securities purchase contracts migrated away from the American Rule and towards the English rule. As noted above, New York law dominates the choice of law in the contracts in our sample. Although we have no reason to believe that the ex ante choice of law rule perceived to be efficient should be associated with a particular attorney fee clause, some of the results may be associated with the choice of New York law. It is therefore desirable to assess whether fee clause patterns vary with choice of law. In the interest of brevity and due to New York's dominance, we report results separately for contracts designating New York law and contracts selecting any other governing law. Appendix Table A2 shows the use of fee clauses in contracts specifying the two other states that lead in choice of law, California and Delaware. because of the nature of contracts in an industry or because of common practice within an industry. Appendix Table A1 reports the pattern of fee clauses by industry and suggests that the fee clause type is not strongly associated with industry. No industry had as much of 50% of contracts with either the American Rule or the English Rule.
B.
Regression Results As Part IV.A demonstrates, several variables may contribute to the observed pattern of attorney fee clauses. We therefore employ regression models to explore the simultaneous influence of multiple factors. Although more than one dependent variable and more than one model are reasonable candidates to explore in multiple variable models, 68 we simplify the analysis by employing a dichotomous dependent variable equal to "1" if a contract specified the American Rule on fees and equal to "0" if the contract specified some other fee rule, including the English Rule. We are thus modeling associations with selecting the American Rule rather than associations for a more detailed pattern of fee clauses. The regression results are consistent with the non-regression results in Part IV.A.
In model (1), as in Table 3 , but now controlling for non-U.S. party status and the presence of arbitration clauses and jury trial waiver clauses, trust agreements and employment contracts are most likely to employ the American Rule. Security agreements and bond indentures are the least likely to use the American Rule. As suggested by Table 4 , non-U.S. party status is associated in all models with use of the American Rule. As suggested by Table 5 , the presence of an arbitration clause is associated in all models with rejection of the American Rule. As suggested by Table 8 , the presence of a jury trial waiver clause is negatively associated with use of the American Rule. As suggested by Table 6 , relational contract status is associated with acceptance of the American Rule. But note that this effect is not statistically significant in model (3), which also accounts for contract type. So the stronger association between relational contract status and the American Rule in model (2) is likely due to the fact that this model does not account for contract type. As suggested by Table 7 , increased standardization is associated with rejection of the American Rule. As suggested by Table   9 , once contract type is controlled for, contracts specifying New York law tend to use the American Rule.
V. Discussion
The data examined above show no single overarching pattern. Parties do display a substantial tendency to opt out of the American Rule and into some variant of the English Rule. Yet the American Rule also retains considerable popularity. Our data thus tend to indicate that neither system for compensating attorneys enjoys an overwhelming efficiency advantage.
The data do display interesting and statistically significant variation, but the interpretation of the results is not always straightforward. Several of our initial hypotheses were disconfirmed. For example, we predicted that foreign parties would tend to demand fee arrangements that conformed to the practices in their home jurisdictions, and therefore that contracts with a foreign party would tend to opt out of the American Rule. The opposite was the case: contracts with non-US parties were significantly more likely to utilize the American Rule. We do not have a clear answer for why contracts with foreign parties would display this tendency.
We also predicted that contracts containing mandatory arbitration clauses would tend to prefer the American Rule because in arbitration it is often impossible to determine which party prevailed. Here, too, our prediction was disconfirmed: contracts with arbitration clauses turned out to be relatively more likely to opt out of the American Rule.
Again, the reason for this pattern is not immediately evident.
We predicted that highly standardized contracts would tend to opt for the American Rule, simply because it is the background norm in the United States, and also would display lower variance in fee arrangements than individually negotiated contracts.
Our data do not support this hypothesis. Contrary to our predictions, we found some evidence that variance increased rather than decreased with standardization. Further, standardization turned out to be significantly negatively associated with the American Rule in our regression models: the more standardized the contract, the more likely it was that the parties would select into some other regime. These results may be due to the fact that highly standardized contracts tend to be financial transactions where large banks insist that the non-reporting company (i.e., the borrower) pay their fees in the event of a dispute over repayment.
Some of our predictions were confirmed by the data. Relational contracts tended to prefer the American Rule, as we predicted, although this pattern was significant in only one of two regression models. We interpret this result as suggesting that parties in relational contracts tend to trust one another and prefer to avoid litigation that calls attention to which one of them was in the wrong from a legal point of view.
We also predicted that loser-pays rules would be more frequently observed in the presence of jury trial waivers. This prediction was confirmed in the data: jury waivers were significantly negatively associated with the American Rule in all three regression models. Perhaps this pattern is due to the parties' greater confidence that judges will rule in their favor, and thus greater willingness to trade off a liability to pay their opponent's fee in the event of a bad result in exchange for the right to have their own attorney fees paid by the adversary if they win.
Our study confirms the hypothesis that fee provisions vary with contract type.
We observe highly statistically significant differences in fee arrangements among the twelve contract categories. Yet it is not easy to explain these differences. Bond indentures and underwriting agreements opted out of the American Rule at a relatively high rate; trust agreements displayed a preference for the American Rule. Why this would be the case is not evident to us. Perhaps what we are observing is simply the result of a path-dependent history of drafting in which certain clauses tended to be associated with particular types of contracts.
While we view our results as providing evidence of the efficiency of different types of attorney compensation regimes, and specifically as suggesting that, depending on the circumstances, sophisticated contracting parties view the American Rule as equally desirable with the English Rule, we also emphasize a number of potential caveats that might qualify the results:
1. This is the first statistical study of its kind and it is important to recognize its limitations. Our data are restricted to a particular type of contract -major commercial contracts deemed to constitute or be related to material events for publicly traded firms.
Our findings do not necessarily translate to other contractual settings. The contracts we study also occupy a small slice of time; ideally we would like information for periods before and after the first half of 2002. Variation across our twelve contract types in the rates of dispute resolution clauses studied suggests that more sophisticated modeling of the decision to include such clauses could be fruitful. The details of the relations between the contracting parties and the motivations of those drafting the clauses could be studied.
With respect to international contracts, our sample comes wholly from a database limited to firms with public offerings in the United States. This may affect the frequency with which international contracts appear in the data or can reliably be characterized as international.
2. We can postulate that parties to major business-to-business contracts do not anticipate a substantial probability of frivolous litigation. If this is so, then a major advantage of the English Rule -its perceived role in deterring unmeritorious lawsuitswould be largely absent for the contracts in our sample. Our study does not test for whether the English Rule would be preferred by contracting parties in contexts where frivolous litigation is considered to be a serious danger. Beyond this, we cannot, based on our data, identify whether the revealed preferences of the parties are due to a particular arrangement's perceived role in enhancing settlement probability, reducing litigation expenditures, or other factors.
3. The alignment between the outcome of private bargaining and social surplus will potentially be undermined if the outcome of that process affects the interests of third parties not present at the bargaining table.
71
Decisions about litigation involve externalities. The court system is subsidized, so that parties do not pay the full social costs of going to court. In this respect litigation imposes uncompensated costs on the public at large. On the other hand litigation also generates positive externalities to the extent that it enhances compliance with (efficient) laws or produces precedents to guide future conduct. If these externalities are significant (and not offsetting), this could reduce the probative value of our research as regards the welfare qualities of different fee regimes. We do not believe, however, that the potential externalities are sufficiently important to seriously undermine the evidentiary value of our results.
4. The observed contract terms may not align with social welfare if agency costs are significant -if the attorneys who negotiate and draft the contracts serve their own interests at the expense of their clients. There is no doubt that arrangements for compensating attorneys are potentially important to their well-being (assuming the same firm will conduct the litigation as negotiates the contract), and therefore that agency costs may potentially play a role in skewing the observed contract terms away from the ones that maximize the joint welfare of the parties. But the direction of an agency cost effect, companies. 73 The provisions for resolving disputes under the contract would appear important enough to receive attention from the attorneys. Attorney compensation clauses appear in a significant number of contracts that appear to be individually negotiated (e.g., settlement of disputes). Even when contract in question is standardized (e.g., pooling and servicing agreements), it is likely that the model on which the contract is based has already been thoroughly reviewed and considered by sophisticated business lawyers.
Loser-pays clauses are found in widely available model contracts. 74 Accordingly, we believe it likely that the presence or absence of an attorney compensation clause in a sophisticated commercial contract will reflect considered judgments about what arrangement best serves the joint interests of the parties.
VI. Conclusion
Our study suggests that the choice of attorney fee rules is complex and affected by multiple factors. We find that neither the American Rule nor the English rules dominates the contracting practices of sophisticated firms. The mixture of preferences for fee rules suggests that much of the voluminous theorizing about attorney fees needs to be revisited.
Many theoretical models may assume that a single preferred compensation method exists.
The evidence contradicts that assumption. New theories ought to try to account for the real-world variation in parties' behavior, perhaps including variables such as those explore here, or explain why parties depart from a theoretically supported result.
75 73 Katz suggests that the non-drafting party may fail to notice a fee provision in a contract, but his observation is concerned with one-sided fee-shifting clauses in retail or consumer contracts. Katz, supra note 19. 74 See, e.g., http://contracts.onecle.com/instinet/marshall. sep.2002 sep. .05.03.shtml ¶ 18, visited Sept. 7, 2006 ("Attorney Fees. The parties agree that, in any suit brought by either party for breach of this Agreement by the other, the non-prevailing party will be liable for the reasonable attorneys fees of the prevailing party.") 75 Combining the results in this article with those from other analyses of the same set of contracts, we can articulate some "standard" dispute resolution provisions in an imaginary but representative material contract of large firms. Our findings in this article suggest that the contract is about as likely to specify the 
